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ABSTRACT: The Caribbean region faces a daunting challenge as it confronts the COVID-19 pandemic. This study aims to shed light on the intricate relationship between governance quality and the economic performance of Caribbean nations, especially in the context of a global health crisis. Our research method involves a panel-random effects model, which captures the effects of governance quality and the COVID-19 pandemic on economic growth. We utilize data from various Caribbean countries, considering six dimensions of governance quality, trade openness, inflation, investment, and human capital. This comprehensive approach ensures a nuanced understanding of the region's economic landscape during these turbulent times. Our findings expose a significant negative association between the various dimensions of governance and the ongoing pandemic crisis. Specifically, governance indicators such as voice and accountability, rule of law, political stability, and absence of violence, along with government effectiveness, emerge as positive catalysts for economic growth. On the contrary, the control of corruption and regulatory quality demonstrate a notable negative impact on growth. Furthermore, our research unveils that investment and human capital significantly contribute to boosting output growth in the Caribbean. Conversely, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation, and trade openness is observed to be detrimental to economic growth. These findings corroborate existing empirical evidence on the governance-growth nexus, underscoring the complex interplay between governance and economic development. These results emphasize the urgency of long-term strategies to enhance governance quality in Caribbean countries. It is imperative to bolster the capacity of governments to address future epidemic episodes, recognizing the persistent threat of pandemics. Policymakers should prioritize measures that promote voice and accountability, rule of law, political stability, and government effectiveness while addressing corruption and regulatory quality issues. This research holds profound significance for both academics and policymakers, offering a pathway to stable and sustainable long-term economic growth and calling for proactive preparedness in the face of future global health challenges. It also invites further research in this critical area.

This paper develops a theoretical framework to investigate the
relationship between public spending and economic growth, where public
spending provides both productive capital and unproductive services. We
take into account the quality of bureaucracy with the possibility of
rent-seeking motives. A key feature of the model is that it
distinguishes between utility enhancing and productivity enhancing
public spending. In the absence of rent-seeking motives, the paper
demonstrates that public spending will promote economic growth only if
marginal productivity of spending is high enough to offset the potential
output loss due to increased taxation. In the presence of rent-seeking,
however, the impact of public spending on economic growth depends on the
quality of bureaucracy and how the latter impinges upon the rentseeking
behaviour. The analysis shows that while improvement in bureaucratic
quality would unambiguously raise the share of utility enhancing public
spending, its impact on economic growth would depend on how bureaucratic
quality influences the relative magnitudes of the two types of public
spending as well as on how far bureaucratic extraction will be
controlled as a result of improvement in bureaucratic quality.
Bureaucratic extraction is likely to be minimised with strong
institutions and effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms
thereby improving the prospects of economic growth. JEL Classification:
C61, D23, D61, D73, H50 Keywords: Rent-seeking, Quality of Bureaucracy,
Public Goods, Public Expenditures

The size of the public sector is an important tool in public governance. Public sector size may fuel both economic growth and political influence over the economy. By compiling and processing data from different sources of public accounts the paper aims at mapping the development of key financial indicators for the Norwegian central government sector during the transition period from the mid 19th to the mid 20th century. The data enable us to give measures of the size of the public sector alone and compared to the overall economy. It is found that the sector started its continuous growth before politicians deliberately started to increase the sector's size of the total economy. The paper also finds that an increase of the public sector often, but not always, reflects political economy regimes. Persistent growth in public finances as a tool for economic policy making did not take place before the introduction of the social-democratic regime in 1935. The paper also concludes that economic growth started before the growth in the public sector, suggesting that public sector growth might as well be a result of economic growth or vice versa ; publishedVersion

Having noted the achievements in social and economic development of the country as well as the improvement of investment climate, the author analyzes the experience of corporate governance. The RF government trying to rise the efficiency of the corporate sector hardens the requirements to information disclosure, perfection of legal regulation of affiliate entities, strengthening the responsibility of board of directors members for causing damage to shareholders.

PurposeThis paper seeks to investigate the relation among corruption, institutional quality and economic growth.Design/methodology/approachIt expands the Erlich and Lui (JPE) endogenous growth model. From this model, institutional aspects such as judicial corruption, bureaucracy, democracy and income inequality are introduced into the analysis in order to identify the institutional conditions that may inhibit corruption and stimulate economic growth.FindingsIt was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of bureaucratic corruption on growth crucially depends on other institutional aspects of the economy and that judicial corruption amplifies the perverse effects of bureaucratic corruption.Originality/valueThe paper explains why some countries with a lot of corruption grow at high rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of judicial or bureaucratic corruption it may grow at high rates but, when these two kinds of corruptions occur at the same time, then the economy will be at a low‐growth pitfall.

Over the last 15 years, most of the World Bank studies have focused on development of standards governance indicators which do not take into consideration the realities of developing countries such as Tunisia. Many countries have adopted these indicators to measure their governance quality. Yet none, to our knowledge, has attempted to define its local governance indicators. The purpose of this study is to show the need for developing a local governance indicator. The following variables have been selected: contract intensive money, foreign direct investment, scientific and technical articles produced and budgetary policy of the State to elaborate a local governance indicator. Our results indicate that governance variables affect economic growth. According to our results, improving the financial sector, scientific research and State spending policy can enhance economic growth.

The revolution in the Arab world shows that governance variables are as important as are theclassical variables (capital and labour). The denial of political rights, respect of lows andaccountability leads to inefficiency and low rate of economic growth in the long run. Over thelast 15 years, most of the World Bank studies have focused on development of standardsgovernance indicators which do not take into consideration the realities of developing countriessuch as Tunisia. Many countries have adopted these indicators to measure their governancequality. Yet none, to our knowledge, has attempted to define its local governance indicators. Thepurpose of this study is to show the need for developing a local governance indicator. Thefollowing variables have been selected: contract intensive money, foreign direct investment,scientific and technical articles produced and budgetary policy of the State to elaborate a localgovernance indicator.Our results indicate that governance variables affect economic growth. According to ourresults, improving the financial sector, scientific research and State spending policy can enhanceeconomic growth.

This paper investigates the effects of financial development on economic growth with especial emphasis on the role played by governance quality. An indicator of governance built from the Principal Component factor method (PCF) and which takes into account the simultaneous effects of political, institutional and economic governance, is used in mediating such relationship. The study is carried out using a two-step system dynamic GMM method for 93 developed and developing countries over the 1996–2018 period. The findings from the study revealed that the effects of financial development on economic growth various according to the nature of governance and the level of development of countries. Results show a non-significant effect of financial development on economic growth for low-income countries and a positively significant impact in middle and high-income ones. Estimations demonstrate also that good governance plays an important and significant role in mediating the finance-growth relationship. Finally, results demonstrate that there is a certain threshold level that countries must achieve to make government domestic credit to private sector favorable to economic growth.

This study develops a theoretical a model to examine the
impact of predation on aggregate output and aggregate consumption. Using
game theoretic framework we show that predation, reduces aggregate
output and per capita consumption. Predation occurs when some agents
enjoy comparative advantage in predation. Given predation under
comparative advantage of some agents, a larger part of the aggregate
output accrues to the predators. We also demonstrate that given
inequality of endowments, the poorly endowed enjoys an incentive to
predate. The payoff of the well endowed from production and predation is
the same. Therefore the well endowed has no incentive to predate. If the
well endowed still predates this would be owed to his comparative
advantage in predation rather than the inequality per se. Large
endowments are only one of the numerous sources that afford such
comparative advantage. Good institutions like rule of law and effective
government tame this comparative advantage. It is due to this kind of
taming, that despite significant inequality in some economies, the level
of predation observed is relatively low. Institutional quality thus
determines the level of predation. We also show that redistribution from
well endowed to poorly endowed will not only increase per capita
consumption but will also be a ‗Pareto improvement'. JEL classification:
D03, O43, P14 Keywords: Predation, Institutions, Growth